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Case Comments
Decisions of International Tribunals
EBERHARD DEUTSCH,

DEPARTMENTAL EDITOR

Two cases have just been instituted before the International
Court of Justice, for the purpose of determining issues which have
arisen as to rights in connection with the continental shelf in the
North Sea.
So far as is known, no publication devoted to matters of international law has followed developments as they occur throughout litigation from its institution before, to its conclusion in, an
international tribunal.
The International Lawyer will report, from time to time, all
developments, from inception to ultimate disposition, in the cases
just begun by the Federal Republic of Germany against the Kingdoms of Denmark and of the Netherlands. The first report, that
as to commencement of the actions, pursuant to a brief note thereof
in the last issue, is published herewith.
The within article also records the recent decision in the Argentina-Chile boundary dispute, outlining the basis on which the
Arbitral Court reached its conclusion; some interesting decisions by
Indian courts, involving points related to international law; and
finally two significant opinions of the Arbitral Commission on Property Rights and Interests in Germany.
I. International Arbitration Developments
A. North Sea Boundary Disputes
The current offshore gas-drilling activity in the North Sea has
resulted in submission of -two interesting boundary disputes to the
International Court of Justice.
Under date of February 21, 1967, the Court issued a press
communiqu6 advising that, on the previous day, the Registry had
been advised of two Special Agreements, one between the Kingdom
of Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany, and the other
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between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, for submission of differences to the Court.
The Special Agreements, which are practically identical substantively, recite that in each case the delimitation of the coastal
continental shelf in the North Sea between the parties has been laid
down by Convention (December 1, 1964, between West Germany
and the Netherlands; June 9, 1965, between Denmark and West
Germany), but that disagreement exists as to the further (outward)
course of the boundary.
The Agreements do not request the Court to fix the boundaries,
but only to declare the applicable principles and rules of international law. The parties bind themselves to delimit the continental
shelf in the North Sea as between themselves pursuant to the principles and rules declared by the Court.
In each case, a Memorial is to be submitted by West Germany
within six months after February 20, 1967, a Counter-Memorial by
the other party within six months after delivery of the German Memorial, and a reply and rejoinder within further time limits fixed by
the Court, all without prejudice to any question of burden of proof.
B. Argentina-Chile Boundary Arbitration
On December 9, 1966, Queen Elizabeth II handed down the
United Kingdom's award in a boundary dispute between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile. The dispute arose as to
interpretation of an award made by King Edward VII on November
20, 1902, fixing parts of the boundary between the two countries.
The 1966 award was based on the report of a Court of Arbitration
consisting of Lord McNair as President, Mr. L. P. Kirwan, and Brigadier K. M. Papworth (Professor D. H. N. Johnson, Registrar).
Because of confusion as to the identity and course of the Rio
Encuentro, controversy developed as to the course of the boundary
fixed by the 1902 award between Boundary Posts 16 (at the juncture of Rios Carrenleufu/Palena and Encuentro/Falso Engano) and
17 (Lake General Paz), a distance of about 38 kilometers or 24
miles, as the crow flies.
The difficulty stemmed from the provision of Article III of the
1902 Award, as amplified by reference to paragraph 22 of the report of the Arbitration Tribunal, that the boundary in the area at
issue should pass to a point on the Rio Palena oposite the junction
of the Rio Encuentro; should then follow the Rio Encuentro along
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the course of its western branch to its source on the western slopes
of Cerro Virgen; and ascending the peak called Cerro Virgen, should
then follow the local water-parting southwards to the northern shore
of Lake General Paz.
In fact, neither branch of the Rio Encuentro has its source on
the slopes of Cerro Virgen. The river on the western slopes of
Cerro Virgen is the Rio Engano, which has its source in the Lagunas del Engano just north of Lake General Paz, and flows across
the slopes of Cerro Virgen into the Rio el Salto (or el Tigre), a
branch of which rises on the western slopes of Cerro Virgen, and
which in turn flows into the Rio Palena at a point west of the junction of the Rio Encuentro with the Palena.
Further ground for dispute stemmed from the fact that a short
distance south of its junction with the Palena, the Rio Encuentro
divides into two main water-courses. Chile of course submitted that
the more eastward of these is the continuation of the Encuentro,
whereas Argentina just as naturally insisted that the eastern branch
is the Rio Falso Engano, and that the branch to the west is in fact
the continuation of the Encuentro.
Argentina also contended that the Rio el Salto (or el Tigre)
should have been considered as the Encuentro for purposes of marking the boundary in the first place, since this is the river joining the
Palena which has a source on the western slopes of Cerro Virgen.
However, the 1965-66 arbitration was simplified by the fact that
a Mixed Boundary Commission set up by Argentina and Chile in
1941 to try to work out their differences under the 1902 Award, had
already established that the boundary in the area in dispute runs in
the north from the junction of the Rios Palena and Encuentro to
the confluence of the eastern and westerly water-courses of the Encuentro, and in the south from Cerro Virgen along the local waterparting to Boundary Post 17 on the northern shore of Lake General
Paz.
From the confluence of the branches of the Encuentro, Argentina contended that the boundary should, in order to meet the river
having a source on the western slopes of Cerro Virgen, follow the
westerly water-course of the Encuentro to its most westerly source,
thence travel overland a short distance to the Rio Engano, follow
the Engano to its junction with the Rio el Salto (or el Tigre), then
turn southward along the latter river to the source of that branch
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on the western slopes of Cerro Virgen, then following the local waterparting southward to Boundary Post 17.
Chile argued, perhaps somewhat less persuasively, that the
boundary should follow the eastern water-course of the Encuentro
to its source on the slopes of the Cordon de las Virgenes, and thence
along the watershed to Post 17. Chile bolstered its position by suggesting initially that a mountain considerably to the east, and called
by Chile since 1955 Pico Virgen, is the peak to which reference is
made in the 1902 Award as the Cerro Virgen. Chile also relied on
evidence of Chilean administration in the disputed area, and Chilean
loyalties of the inhabitants.
Both countries urged estoppel (preclusion) against each other,
Chile on the basis of concessions it claimed Argentina had made in
the course of an exchange of diplomatic notes in 1913-15 with reference to the question at issue, Argentina on the basis of certain
official Chilean maps, issued between 1913 and 1952, which showed
the boundary running on a course nearer to that for which Argentina contended.
The Court of Arbitration declined to assign weight to an isolated statement in one of the Argentine notes indicating that Boundary Post 16 should have been placed farther east; and also found
no estoppel against Chile, in light of the prevailing ignorance as to
the geography of the area, although noting that its erroneous cartography over such a long period seemed at odds with its claim of
administration of the disputed territory during the same period.
There was much argument by the parties as to the "critical
date," in this case, meaning the date after which the Court should
not admit evidence of administrative activities of the parties in the
disputed area. The Court, since it was charged with interpreting a
previous Award, found the concept of the critical date to be of little
value in its determination.
Both parties, but particularly Chile, submitted "fulfillment material" in evidence of their respective exercises of administrative
jurisdiction in the area. This evidence referred to registration of
land titles, imposition of land taxes and military service, registration
of settlers with the police, registration of births, marriages, and deaths,
maintenance of electoral rolls and animal brand registers, taking of
censuses, provision of health and educational facilities and so on.
The Court, while rejecting Argentina's contention of irrelevance,
nevertheless found this evidence inconclusive, since it found that the
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inhabitants turned to the authorities of both countries in case of
need, and tried to keep on good terms with both sides.
The Court of Arbitration accordingly rested its determination
exclusively on interpretation of the 1902 Award. In this connection, two of the three members of the Court, accompanied by its
technical staff, journeyed to the disputed area as a field mission, and
made both air and ground reconnaissance of the territory, which was
also aerially photographed.
The Court's approach to the problem it faced was dominated
by two principles: first, the general principle that when a river
forming a boundary divides, the boundary normally follows the
major channel; and second, that it was the intention of the 1902
Award that the boundary proceed through Cerro Virgen.
As to the first point, the Court found that official reports of
Argentina, dating to within a few years after 1902, identified the
eastern branch of the Rio Encuentro as the major channel, a conclusion which the Court considered as confirmed scientifically by the
greater length, annual volume, and drainage area of this branch.
The Court determined that the boundary should follow this
branch to the point of its closest approach to Cerro Virgen, that,
at that point, the boundary (in accord with the general practice of
the 1902 Award) should follow local water-partings to Cerro Virgen, proceeding thence by local water-partings to Boundary Post 17.
A Demarcation Mission was named to mark the course of the
boundary pursuant to the new award, which largely followed Argentina's contentions, but did depart therefrom sufficiently to place
most of the Chilean settlers in Chile.
II. Decisions of Indian Courts
In a case reminiscent of Haddock v. The King,* the Government of India contended, in Jethwani v. Kazi (All India Reporter
1966 Bombay 54), that it has absolute discretion to grant or deny
a passport to any citizen of India. This contention received short
shrift in the Bombay High Court. The petitioner had received
several passports over a period of years, when his latest application
was rejected without assignment of reasons. The Government defended against his writ petition for judicial relief, solely on the stated
ground.
* Reported in Herbert, Uncommon Law 110.
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The Court noted that Indian law, by prohibiting entry into
India without a passport, necessarily implies a governmental obligation to issue passports in proper cases, since the Constitution preserves the right of all Indian citizens to reside in India. The Court
found further that since the Government concededly issues passports to some citizens, arbitrary refusal of a passport to any citizen
would violate the Constitutional rule against denial of equality before the law.
Finally, the Court held that freedom of travel abroad is included in "personal liberty" guaranteed by the Constitution against
deprivation except according to procedure established by law. Having decided that passports may not, for these reasons, be denied
administratively except pursuant to legislative standards (of which
none have been formulated to date), the Government was ordered
to honor the petitioner's passport application. The Kerala High
Court reached the same result in Manjooram v. Government of India
(AIR 1966 Kerala 20).
Chibar v. Union of India (AIR 1966 Supreme Court 442) involved the question of subsistence of rights acquired under the Portuguese r6gime in Goa. The Supreme Court applied the settled rule
that in cases of territorial acquisition by conquest, the new sovereign
need recognize only rights granted or recognized by him vis-a-vis
the residents.
In Parwatawwa v. Channawwa (AIR 1966 Mysore 100), the
Mysore High Court applied the federal-state rule, familiar in
America, that possession of Indian (national) domicile (as a condition of citizenship) does not preclude the concurrent existence of
domicile within a particular Indian State for purposes of application of State law.
III. Arbitral Commission on Property
Rights and Interests in Germany
In the case of Coenrad J. Veerman (No. 243), the Third
Chamber of the Arbitral Commission adhered to the Commission's
consistent holding that, for purposes of obtaining compensation under
Articles 3 and 4 of Chapter Five of the Settlement Convention for
property confiscated by the German authorities during World War
II, it is essential that the claimant prove that the confiscated property was, after the cessation of hostilities, actually in territory now
part of the Federal Republic of Germany or Berlin.
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Since the instant claimant could show only that his property,
having been confiscated in the Netherlands, was loaded aboard German Rhine vessels, and such evidence did not exclude the possibility
of destruction of the property by aerial bombardment or distribution thereof at some place now within the boundaries of East Germany, the Third Chamber, on April 27, 1966, dismissed the claimant's application. *
In the case of Dr. Ren6 Springer (No. 305), the Second Chamber of the Commission, in a judgment handed down on May 26,
1966, re-examined the question of exemption of nationals of any of
the United Nations from the Mortgage Profits Tax imposed by the
Federal Republic pursuant to the Equalisation of Burdens Law. Since
the question of exemption from this particular tax has not been
considered by the Commission in Plenary Session, the Second Chamber went into the matter at some length.
Dr. Springer, at the time of his escape from Germany and
naturalization in France in 1933, owned property in Heidelberg
which was encumbered with a mortgage. Fearing confiscation, he
agreed to sale of the property, but after the war he was awarded
co-ownership of a six-tenths share on the ground that the property
had been sold under abnormal circumstances. His RM 12,000 share
of the subsisting mortgage debt was converted into DM 1,200 by
the currency reform, and the resultant 90% profit was taxed away
under the Mortgage Profits Tax, designed to prevent unjust enrichment of debtors as a result of conversion of Reichsmark mortgage
debts.
The Settlement Convention provides for exemption of certain
United Nations nationals from exceptional taxes on property imposed for the specific purpose of meeting charges arising out of the
war, or out of reparation or restitution to any of the United Nations; recites that when a tax is levied only partly for such purposes,
the exemption shall "in principle" be proportionate to the part of
the tax imposed for these purposes; and states that in the case of
Immediate Aid and property levies under the Equalisation of Burdens
Law, the partial exemption extends to payments falling due in the
* The same result was reached on the same date in the case of Edgar
Rothschild et al. (No. 254), Willie and Gertrud Scheidt (No. 255-property brought to Lubeck, but no showing made that it was in existence there
or elsewhere after cessation of hostilities in Germany), and Siegfried Rosenthal
(No. 245).
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six-year period from 1 April 1949 to 31 March 1955. There is no
reference to the Mortgage Profits Tax.
The Commission's consideration of the question proceeded
from its settled principle that no general rule of public international
law establishes an exemption, in favor of former enemies of a defeated nation, from taxes imposed by the nation to meet its war
costs, but that such an exemption can be effected only by agreement.
The Commission found that whereas Chairman McCloy had
commenced his discussions with Chancellor Adenauer on the basis
of the same general exemption of United Nations nationals from
war-cost taxes that had been allowed in the case of Italy and other
German allies, this rigid position had been modified considerably
in the course of the protracted negotiations that ensued; and that,
in the end, two classes of tax exemptions were established by the
Settlement Convention-a total exemption from exceptional taxes
levied expressly to meet war costs and reparation payments, and a
partial exemption as to specified taxes recognized -as having been
imposed for these and other purposes.
The Commission found further that the specification of reparation-payment taxes, in addition to war-cost taxes, is indicative of a
restrictive meaning of the term "war costs," which, in a broad sense,
would include reparation payments without specification thereof.
The Commission went on to deduce that the exemption applies to
taxes levied to meet clear and direct material damage caused by the
war, plus all exceptional expenditures incurred to compensate the
victorious nations for their occupation costs and war losses. The
Commission found that the exemption does not extend to taxes imposed to defray the expenses of re-establishing and consolidating the
political, economic and social structure of the defeated nation, since
the family of nations has a predominant interest in the stability and
security of its members.
Among the exceptional taxes accordingly not covered by the
exemption, the Commission placed those whose proceeds are destined for reconstruction, public assistance, re-integration of refugees,
public works and the alleviation of hardships caused by currency
reform.
As to the Mortgage Profits Tax, the Commission found this
to be a mixed-purpose tax not subject to total exemption. In the
absence of any reference thereto in the provision for partial exempInternational Lawyer, Vol. 1, No. 4
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tion, the Commission had recourse to the travaux prparatoiresleading up to the Settlement Convention; and on the basis of a letter
from Chairman McCloy to Chancellor Adenauer, it deduced that
the parties intended to grant no exemption from the taxes levied under
the Equalisation of Burdens Law, except for the Immediate Aid
and property levies for which specific partial-exemption provision
is made in the Convention.
The Commission also concluded that decisive weight on this
point should be accorded to the fact that none of the United Nations
governments have intervened to support their nationals' claims to
exemption from the Mortgage Profits Tax, although it has been
assessed regularly against United Nations nationals.
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